Abstract. This paper proves "tight security in the random-oracle model relative to factorization" for the lowest-cost signature systems available today: every hash-generic signature-forging attack can be converted, with negligible loss of efficiency and effectiveness, into an algorithm to factor the public key. The most surprising system is the "fixed unstructured B = 0 Rabin/Williams" system, which has a tight security proof despite hashing unrandomized messages. At a lower level, the three main accomplishments of the paper are (1) a "B ≥ 1" proof that handles some of the lowest-cost signature systems by pushing an idea of Katz and Wang beyond the "claw-free permutation pair" context; (2) a new expository structure, elaborating upon an idea of Koblitz and Menezes; and (3) a proof that uses a new idea and that breaks through the "B ≥ 1" barrier. Table 1 . Proven lower bounds on "security in the random-oracle model" relative to roots (for RSA) or factorization (for Rabin/Williams). 1996 Bellare/Rogaway proved tight security for RSA and outlined a proof for unstructured Rabin/Williams, but specifically prohibited principal Rabin/ Williams and required large B. 1999 Kurosawa/Ogata claimed tight security for principal B = 0 Rabin/Williams (starred entries in the table), but the Kurosawa/Ogata "proof" has a fatal flaw and the "theorem" appears unsalvageable. 2003 Katz/Wang introduced a new proof allowing B as small as 1 for "claw-free permutation pairs," but "claw-free permutation pairs" are not general enough to cover Rabin/Williams. This paper generalizes the Katz/Wang idea to cover Rabin/ Williams, and introduces a new security proof covering fixed unstructured B = 0 Rabin/Williams.
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Introduction
Variants of the Rabin/Williams public-key signature system have, for twenty-five years, held the speed records for signature verification. Are these systems secure?
There are many other signature systems of RSA/Rabin type. One can break each system by computing roots modulo the signer's public key pq or by breaking the system's hash function H. Are there other attacks? This is not an idle concern: some RSA-type systems have been broken by embarrassing attacks that (1) are much faster than known methods to compute roots modulo pq and (2) work for every function H (or a large fraction of all H's), given oracle access to H.
Some systems have been proven immune to embarrassing attacks. For example, in the 1993 paper [6] that popularized this line of work (along with the terminology "secure in the randomoracle model"), Bellare and Rogaway proved the following security property for the traditional "FDH" form of exponent-e RSA: every H-generic attack on RSA-FDH can be converted (without serious loss of efficiency) into an algorithm to compute eth roots modulo pq.
Unfortunately, a closer look reveals that most of these proofs merely limit the embarrassment, without actually ruling it out. For example, the Bellare/Rogaway root-finding algorithm has only a 1/Q chance of success, where Q is the number of hash values seen by the FDH attack. Coron in [14] introduced a better algorithm having a 1/S chance of success, where S is the number of signatures seen by the FDH attack; but S can still be quite large.
Randomized signatures, in which B-bit random strings are prepended to messages before the messages are signed, allow much tighter proofs if B is large. For example, every H-generic attack on randomized exponent-e RSA (or Rabin's 1979 signature system) can be converted into a algorithm to compute eth roots modulo pq (or to factor pq) with a good chance of success. But generating random strings takes time, and transmitting the strings consumes bandwidth. Can we do better?
A 2002 theorem of Coron is widely interpreted as saying that FDH is stuck at 1/S, i.e., that tight proofs require randomization of hash inputs; see [16] . A tight security proof by Katz and Wang in [19] allows much shorter random strings for some RSA variants but breaks down for Rabin/Williams. There are other systems with tight security proofs, but none of them offer stateof-the-art efficiency.
Contributions. This paper proves tight security for several state-of-the-art variants of the Rabin/ Williams public-key signature system. What's most surprising is the "fixed unstructured B = 0" variant, a specific type of FDH that has a tight security proof despite hashing unrandomized messages. In the Rabin/Williams context, a minor technical assumption in Coron's theorem-the assumption of "unique" signatures-turns out to be a major loophole, producing a tight security proof from a random choice later in the signing process, after all hashing is done.
There are actually two security proofs in this paper. The "B ≥ 1" proof uses a more general approach, pushing the Katz/Wang idea beyond the well-known "claw-free permutation pair" setting and carefully handling the "tweaked square roots" that appear in the Rabin/Williams system. The "unstructured B = 0" proof relies on a new proof idea that is more specific but also responsible for the aforementioned surprise. As far as I can tell, the new proof idea is tied to Rabin/Williams and cannot say anything useful about RSA; within the Rabin/Williams context, the new proof idea is tied to "unstructured" signatures and does not cover "principal" or "|principal|" signatures. The specific case of "fixed unstructured B = 0" Rabin/Williams signatures is nevertheless worth study because it is a state-of-the-art signature system of particular interest to implementors; among all high-speed systems with tight security proofs it is the only one that does not need to randomize hash inputs.
My proofs follow a new expository structure that explicitly separates five levels of hard problems (generic blind inversion, generic selective inversion using one signature, generic selective inversion using many signatures, generic existential inversion, and generic attacks) and that closely tracks the intuition of a cryptanalyst studying potential attacks. Previous proofs can be, and gain in clarity from being, rewritten within the same structure; for example, the structure formalizes the standard use of a simulator as a very easy step from the first-level hard problem to the second-level hard problem, with all other difficulties stripped away. I can easily imagine the structure being useful for future proofs; I hope that one proof suffices to make the general structure clear.
These proofs owe a heavy debt to the efforts of Koblitz and Menezes to clarify the limits of "provable security"; see [25] and [26] . In particular, in [25, Section 3.2] , in the case of RSA with B = 0, Koblitz and Menezes explicitly stated an apparently new "RSA1" hard problem (which I call "generic existential inversion") and conjectured that it had the same difficulty as the usual hard problem (which I call "generic blind inversion"). The simplicity and clarity of the new hard problem inspired me to consider the analogous problem for Rabin/Williams. Koblitz and Menezes had commented that Coron's 1/S reduction could be translated to a 1/S reduction between these two hard problems, and that it was unreasonable to hope for a better reduction in light of Coron's 2002 theorem. I was quite surprised to discover that the "unstructured" case of the analogous Rabin/Williams conjecture could in fact be proven. An illustrative error in the literature. The 1999 paper [28] by Kurosawa and Ogata spends several sections presenting "two efficient Rabin type digital signature schemes" that are "much faster" than the original Rabin signature scheme. The paper also claims to prove that "breaking the proposed digital signature scheme by chosen plaintext attack is as hard as factoring N ." The claimed theorem, "Theorem 1" in [28, Section 6] , states bounds as tight as one could possibly hope for.
As discussed later in this paper, there is nothing new in Kurosawa/Ogata signatures; they are one of the standard forms of Rabin/Williams signatures, specifically what I call "principal B = 0" Rabin/Williams signatures. What Kurosawa and Ogata claim is that they have proven tight security for principal B = 0 Rabin/Williams signatures.
For comparison, the 2003 Katz/Wang paper [19] advertises tight security with only one extra bit of hash input. This 1999 Kurosawa/Ogata paper was already claiming tight security with no extra bits of hash input. This might appear, at first glance, to be the same surprising "B = 0" claim that I am making in this paper; the details of the claims are different ("principal" versus "fixed unstructured"), but for novices these details are of no obvious consequence.
Unfortunately, the Kurosawa/Ogata claim is not true. I see no reason to believe that there is any way to prove the Kurosawa/Ogata "theorem." Certainly Kurosawa and Ogata did not prove their "theorem": the Kurosawa/Ogata "proof" has a fatal flaw, a flaw that becomes very easy to spot when the "proof" is rewritten within my expository structure. Details matter! See Section 4 of this paper for further discussion of the Kurosawa/Ogata "proof." 2 Parameters; keys; verification; signing This section defines the family of signature systems whose security is analyzed later in the paper. Standardizing a particular signature system in the family means standardizing various parameters: K, the number of key bits; D, the distribution of secret keys; H, the hash function; and B, the number of bits of randomization of the hash input. The signer's behavior is further controlled by two parameters relevant to security: first, whether signatures are "unstructured" or "principal" or "|principal|"; second, whether signatures are "fixed" or "variable." All of these parameters are explained in detail below.
Readers wondering "Why are you looking at these particular systems?" should read the cost analysis and historical survey in Appendix A. The short answer is that, among all the signature systems that are conjectured to provide a reasonable security level, these systems were engineered to minimize cost. (Exception: in applications where signature length is much more important than verification time, lower costs are achieved by systems of ElGamal/Schnorr/ECDSA type.) This engineering has not produced the world's simplest family of signature systems-this section needs two pages to state all the details of what the signer and verifier do-but the loss in simplicity is justified by the reduction in cost.
Secret keys and public keys. All users of the system know an integer K ≥ 10. Typical choices of K include 1024 (not recommended), 1536, and 2048. All users of the system also know a distribution D (for example, the uniform distribution) of pairs of prime numbers (p, q) such that p ∈ 3 + 8Z, q ∈ 7 + 8Z, and 2 K < pq < 2 K+1 . Each user of the system chooses a random secret key (p, q) from the distribution D, and computes a corresponding public key pq.
For each algorithm A define PrFactor(A) as the probability that A(pq) ∈ {p, q}, when (p, q) is chosen randomly from the distribution D. This probability depends explicitly on A and implicitly on the parameters (K, D); no security is possible when K and D are chosen poorly. If K = 512, for example, then the attacker can use the number-field sieve to factor arbitrary integers between 2 K and 2
K+1 with a moderate amount of effort, and can then freely forge signatures. As another example, if D has highly limited randomness and is concentrated on 2 32 pairs (p, q), the attacker can factor pq by simply trying each of those 2 32 pairs. Theoreticians often simplify this picture by assuming that D is the uniform distribution. In the real world, however, implementors often choose non-uniform distributions to save time in key generation. This paper considers arbitrary distributions of pairs (p, q), and thus arbitrary distributions of public keys pq. For each distribution D, this paper proves that various hard problems involving public keys from distribution D are equivalent to factoring public keys from distribution D.
Hashing and verification. All users of the system know an integer B ≥ 0. Three interesting choices of B are 0, 1, and 128. All users of the system also know a function H : {B-bit strings} × {messages} → 1, 2, . . . , 2 K . For example, for B = 0 and K = 2048, the function H assigns an element of {1, 2, . . . , 2 2048 } to each message. There are many popular choices of H, usually built from components such as MD5, SHA-1, and SHA-256.
A vector (e, f, s) is a tweaked square root of an integer h modulo a public key pq if e ∈ {1, −1}; f ∈ {1, 2}; s ∈ {0, 1, . . . , pq − 1}; and ef s 2 ≡ h (mod pq). A vector (e, f, r, s) is a signature of a message m under a public key pq if r is a B-bit string and (e, f, s) is a tweaked square root of H(r, m).
For example, the algorithm displayed in Appendix A computes a tweaked square root of h, specifically the principal tweaked square root of h. This is the unique tweaked square root (e, f, s) such that e is 1 if h is a square modulo q, otherwise −1; f is 1 if eh is a square modulo p, otherwise 2; and s is a square modulo pq.
The difficulty of forging signatures depends on H. No security is possible when the hash function is chosen poorly. For example, if H(r, m) is determined by MD5(m), then an attacker can find collisions in H by finding collisions in MD5.
Reader beware: Many authors allow the output range of H to be a function of the public key, but there cannot actually be any such dependence when H is a system parameter shared by all users, as it always is in practice. Putting a shared limit on the output range of H also means slightly changing the notion of a generic attack, and slightly changing the security proofs. My proofs include these minor changes.
Unstructured signatures, principal signatures, |principal| signatures. Each message m has exactly 2 B+2 signatures under pq: there are 2 B choices of r, and then 4 choices of tweaked square root (e, f, s) of H(r, m) modulo pq. Which signature does the signer choose?
A stupid signer could easily expose his secret key to the attacker through this choice. For example, the signer could leak the ith bit of p in the ith signature as the bottom bit of r (if B ≥ 0), as the Jacobi symbol of s modulo pq, etc. This example demonstrates that there is no hope of security if the signing function is chosen poorly. How do we know that a smarter-sounding signing algorithm does not have a similar leak?
There are three signature distributions proposed in the literature:
• Unstructured: The signer chooses a uniform random string r, and then a uniform random tweaked square root of H(r, m), independently of all previous choices.
• Principal: The signer chooses a uniform random string r independently of all previous choices, and then chooses the principal tweaked square root of H(r, m).
• |Principal|: The signer chooses a uniform random string r independently of all previous choices, and then chooses the "|principal|" tweaked square root of H(r, m). If the principal tweaked square root is (e, f, s) then the |principal| tweaked square root is (e, f, min{s, pq − s}); the point is that min{s, pq − s} takes a bit less space than s.
One step in this paper's security proofs-see Section 4-is split into three cases accordingly. A later step-see Section 7-is affected much more dramatically by the choice. This paper is not the first paper to point out the importance of the signature distribution for Rabin/Williams security proofs. For example, Bellare and Rogaway in [8, Section 6] wrote "SignPRab . . . returns a random square root . . . We stress that a random root is chosen; a fixed root won't do." In my terminology, Bellare and Rogaway are requiring unstructured signatures and prohibiting principal signatures, |principal| signatures, etc. Sometimes principal signatures require extra work for a security proof (work done in Section 4 of this paper); sometimes they don't seem to allow a security proof at all.
Variable signatures, fixed signatures. What happens if the signer is given the same message to sign once again? There are two choices in the literature:
• Fixed: Given the same message again, the signer chooses the same signature again.
• Variable: Given the same message again, the signer generates a fresh signature, making random choices independently of the previous choices.
To understand the importance of this choice for security, consider the fact that "fixed unstructured B = 0" signatures now have a tight security proof, whereas "variable unstructured B = 0" signatures are easily breakable. The importance of this choice for tight security proofs was pointed out by Katz and Wang in [19] ; the conventional wisdom before [19] was that tight security proofs required a large B.
The above description of fixed signatures might sound as if each signer needs to remember all previous signed messages. However, the signer can produce indistinguishable results without memory, assuming standard conjectures in secret-key cryptography. The trick is simple: the signer replaces the random bits with secret functions of m. This trick was posted to sci.crypt in 1997 by Barwood and independently by Wigley; see [4] and [34] . It was reinvented several years later by Katz and Wang in [19, Section 4.1] . The usual construction is for the signer to first compress m with a very fast "almost universal hash function," and then scramble the result, for example with a block cipher; the relevant conjecture is that the scrambling function is indistinguishable from uniform.
For principal and |principal| signatures with B = 0, no randomness is required, and variable signatures are the same as fixed signatures.
Generic blind inversion
The security proof in this section-in particular, the function RandSquare shown below-is well known, but readers are nevertheless encouraged to read it as a warmup for the security proofs in subsequent sections.
Suppose we are given a public key pq and an integer h ∈ 1, 2, . . . , 2 K . How quickly can we compute a tweaked square root of h modulo pq? One approach is to factor pq; are there better approaches?
More formally: Fix K and D. For each algorithm A define PrInvBlind(A) as the probability that A(pq, h ) is some (e , f , s
• (p, q) is a random secret key from the distribution D, • h is a uniform random element of 1, 2, . . . , 2 K , and (p, q) is independent of h . How large can PrInvBlind(A) be, as a function of the resources consumed by A? Any fast probability-1 algorithm A for this generic-blind-inversion problem immediately implies a fast probability-1 algorithm to forge Rabin/Williams signatures, given oracle access to the hash function H. The attacker simply chooses the message m that he wants to sign, chooses any B-bit string r , computes h = H(r , m ), and uses A to compute a tweaked square root (e , f , s ) of h . Then (e , f , r , s ) is a signature of m . Conversely, cryptanalysts trying to forge Rabin/Williams signatures will naturally consider this simple attack strategy as a first possibility.
Tight security proof. Unfortunately for the cryptanalyst, this problem is provably as difficult as factorization of public keys. Any fast high-probability algorithm A for this problem immediately implies a fast high-probability factorization algorithm RandSquare(A). The proof is completely standard, except for the details of how the tweaks e, f are handled.
Here is the factorization algorithm RandSquare(A):
∈ {1, n}, print it and stop. 6. If gcd{n, s } / ∈ {1, n}, print it and stop.
The following theorem states that a large success chance PrInvBlind(A) implies a similarly large factorization chance PrFactor(RandSquare(A)). The time of RandSquare(A) is practically identical to the time of A: the only difference is a few easy operations modulo n to generate h, repeated only n/2 K < 2 times on average.
Proof. Let (p, q) be a random secret key with distribution D. At step 4 of (RandSquare(A))(pq), the quantity h = ef s 2 mod pq is a uniform random element of 1, 2, . . . , 2 K ; recall that each choice of h is produced by exactly four choices of e, f, s. Thus the event e f (s ) 2 ≡ h (mod pq) occurs with probability exactly PrInvBlind(A). I claim that, given this event, there is conditional probability at least 1/2 that one of s , s − s has a nontrivial factor in common with pq.
Case 2: gcd{h , pq} = p. In this case gcd{s , pq} = p as desired.
Case 3: gcd{h , pq} = q. In this case gcd{s , pq} = q as desired.
(mod pq), and recall that p, q are primes with p ∈ 3 + 8Z and q ∈ 7 + 8Z. Both possibilities for f , namely 1 and 2, are squares modulo q, so f (s ) 2 and f s 2 are squares modulo q, and both are nonzero since gcd{h , q} = 1; the ratio e /e is therefore a square modulo q and hence cannot be −1. Consequently e = e and f (s ) 2 ≡ f s 2 (mod pq). Both (s ) 2 and s 2 are squares modulo p, and both are nonzero since gcd{h , p} = 1; the ratio f /f is therefore a square modulo p and hence cannot be 2. Hence f = f and (s ) 2 ≡ s 2 (mod pq). Recall that there are exactly four choices of e, f, s consistent with h , and observe that e , f , s is independent of this choice. All four choices have the same e, f as I just showed, so only two of them have s ≡ s or s ≡ −s . The other two choices occur with conditional probability 1/2; for those choices, pq divides (s ) 2 − s 2 without dividing s − s or s + s, so gcd{n, s − s} is a nontrivial factor of pq.
Generic selective inversion using one signature
Suppose we're given a public key pq, two integers h, h ∈ 1, 2, . . . , 2 K , and a tweaked square root (e, f, s) of h modulo pq. How quickly can we compute a tweaked square root of h modulo pq? One approach is to factor pq; are there better approaches?
More formally: Fix K and D. Fix α ∈ {unstructured, principal, |principal|}. For each algorithm A define PrInvSelective 1 (A) as the probability that A(pq, h, e, f, s, h ) is some (e , f , s ) ∈ {−1, 1}× {1, 2} × {0, 1, . . . , pq − 1} satisfying e f (s ) 2 ≡ h (mod pq), when
• (p, q) is a random secret key from the distribution D,
• h is a uniform random element of 1, 2, . . . , 2 K , • (e, f, s) is a random tweaked square root of h modulo pq with distribution α, • h is a uniform random element of 1, 2, . . . , 2 K , and all of these choices are independent. How large can PrInvSelective 1 (A) be, as a function of the resources consumed by A? This generic-selective-inversion problem is a natural step for the cryptanalyst beyond the generic-blind-inversion problem in Section 3. Any fast probability-1 algorithm A to solve this problem immediately implies a fast probability-1 algorithm to forge Rabin/Williams signatures, given oracle access to the hash function H. The forgery algorithm takes h and (e, f, s) from a legitimately signed message m, chooses a message m = m, chooses a B-bit string r , computes h = H(r , m ), computes (e , f , s ) = A(pq, h, e, f, s, h ), and outputs (e , f , r , s ) as a successful forgery of m .
Similar comments apply to the problems articulated in subsequent sections. Each problem is a natural problem for the cryptanalyst to consider, providing more flexibility than the previous problem and potentially making attacks easier.
Tight security proof. Unfortunately for the cryptanalyst, this problem is provably as difficult as factorization of public keys. Any fast high-probability algorithm A for this problem immediately implies a fast high-probability algorithm SimSign 1 (A) for the generic-blind-inversion problem, and therefore implies a fast high-probability factorization algorithm RandSquare (SimSign 1 (A) ).
The intuition here is that A learns nothing from seeing h, e, f, s. It is well known how to formalize this intuition: namely, build a simulator that, given pq, generates (h, e, f, s) with exactly the same distribution as a signer who first generates h and then uses p, q to generate (e, f, s).
There are three different constructions of the simulator, and thus three different constructions of SimSign 1 (A), one for each of the three choices of α. Here is SimSign 1 (A) for the simplest choice, α = unstructured: 0. Input n and h . 1. Generate a uniform random vector (e, f, s)
Here is SimSign 1 (A) for α ∈ {principal, |principal|}:
0. Input n and h . 1. Generate a uniform random vector (e , f , x) ∈ {−1, 1} × {1, 2} × {0, . . . , n − 1}. 2. Compute g = gcd{x, n}. 3. If g = n or g mod 8 = 7, set e = 1; otherwise set e = e . 4. If g = n or g mod 8 = 3, set f = 1; otherwise set f = f . 5. Compute s = x 2 mod n. 6. Compute h = ef s 2 mod n. 7. Go back to step 1 if h / ∈ 1, 2, . . . , 2 K . 8. Print A(n, h, e, f, s, h ) if α = principal, else A(n, h, e, f, min{s, n − s}, h ).
The following theorem states that a large success chance PrInvSelective 1 (A) implies a large success chance PrInvBlind (SimSign 1 (A) ). The time of SimSign 1 (A) is practically identical to the time of A: the only difference is a few easy operations modulo n to generate h, repeated only n/2 K < 2 times on average. The reader may have noticed that my constructions of SimSign 1 (A), in the principal and |principal| cases, go to some extra work to handle extremely rare events such as g = n. The reward for this work is a particularly clean theorem. The simulators produce exactly the right output distribution, rather than producing almost exactly the right output distribution and forcing the user to worry about the difference.
Proof
K , independent of (p, q). Consider (SimSign 1 (A))(n, h ) where n = pq.
Unstructured: There are exactly four choices of (e, f, s) for each possible h; so the distribution of h is uniform, and (e, f, s) is a uniform random tweaked square root of h. Thus e f (s ) 2 ≡ h with probability exactly PrInvSelective 1 (A).
Principal: If e = 1 then h ≡ ef s 2 = f s 2 is a square modulo q since 2 is a square modulo q. If e = −1 then h ≡ ef s 2 = −f s 2 , which I claim is a non-square modulo q; otherwise q divides s, so q divides x, so g = gcd{x, n} ∈ {n, q}, so g = n or g mod 8 = 7, so e = 1, contradiction. Similarly, if f = 1 then eh ≡ s 2 is a square modulo p, and if f = 2 then eh ≡ 2s 2 , which I claim is a non-square modulo p; otherwise p divides s, so p divides x, so g = gcd{x, n} ∈ {n, p}, so g = n or g mod 8 = 3, so f = 1, contradiction. Furthermore, by construction s is a square modulo n. Therefore (e, f, s) is the principal tweaked square root of h. The only remaining task is to show that the distribution of h is uniform.
Which choices of (e , f , x) lead to h? Write (e, f, s) for the principal tweaked square root of h. If gcd{h, n} = 1 then gcd{s, n} = 1 so g = gcd{x, n} = 1; thus e = e, f = f , and x is one of the four square roots of s modulo n. If gcd{h, n} = p then gcd{s, n} = p so g = gcd{x, n} = p; thus e = e, f ∈ {1, 2}, and x is one of the two square roots of s modulo n. If gcd{h, n} = q then gcd{s, n} = q so g = gcd{x, n} = q; thus e ∈ {−1, 1}, f = f , and x is one of the two square roots of s modulo n. If gcd{h, n} = n then gcd{s, n} = n so g = gcd{x, n} = n; thus e ∈ {−1, 1}, f ∈ {1, 2}, and x = 0. To summarize, each integer h ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1} is produced by at most four choices of (e , f , x). There are n possibilities for h and 4n possibilities for (e , f , x), so each integer h ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1} is produced by exactly four choices of (e , f , x).
|Principal|: h is uniform exactly as above, and (e, f, s) is the principal tweaked square root of h, so (e, f, min{s, n − s}) is the |principal| tweaked square root of h.
An illustrative error in the literature, continued. Kurosawa and Ogata in [28] claim tight security for principal B = 0 Rabin/Williams signatures (modulo an irrelevant change from −2, −1, 1, 2 to −1/2, −1, 1, 1/2). Specifically, "Theorem 1" in [28, Section 6] is an assertion of tight security for the Kurosawa/Ogata "improved scheme"; [28, Section 5] defines verification in the "improved scheme" by the equation "x 2 = α i H(M ) mod N " where x is the signature, i is implicit, (α 0 , α 1 , α 2 , α 3 ) = (1, 2, −2, −1), M is the message, and N is the public key; [28, Section 5] also defines signing in a deterministic way (as emphasized by Kurosawa and Ogata), and a closer look reveals that the signatures are principal.
Unfortunately, the Kurosawa/Ogata "proof" has many flaws. Most of the flaws are fixable carelessness involving the occasional numbers that have factors in common with pq, but one flaw is fatal.
To answer a hash query ("give me a hash value" at the top of [28, page 62]), the Kurosawa/ Ogata simulator picks r ∈ {0, . . . , pq − 1} and i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} "randomly" and returns r 2 /α i as the hash value. To answer a signing query with that hash value, the simulator returns r. Kurosawa and Ogata claim that the success chance of an attack using this simulator ("Pr[F successes]") is the same as the success chance against the legitimate signer (" (k)"), and that the resulting forgery r 2 /α i = s 2 /α i produces a factor of pq in the frequent case that r = ±s. The big problem with this "proof" is that the distribution of signatures from the Kurosawa/ Ogata simulator is not the same as the distribution of signatures from the legitimate signer. It isn't even close. The simulator produces unstructured square roots, whereas the legitimate signer produces principal square roots.
Because the simulator produces the wrong signature distribution, there is no justification for the claim that this simulation preserves the attack's success probability. To see that the claim is not merely unproven but sometimes flat-out wrong, consider a forger F that collects many signatures, that uses the number-field sieve to factor pq, that uses the factorization to check whether all the signatures are principal, that (artificially!) aborts if any signatures are non-principal, and that finally uses the factorization to generate a forgery. This algorithm F always succeeds against the legitimate signer but never succeeds against the Kurosawa/Ogata simulator.
My expository structure factors these security proofs as compositions of simple reductions with clear interfaces. For example, the job of SimSign 1 (A) is to convert its input (pq, h ), with distribution defined by PrInvBlind, into an input (pq, h, e, f, s, h ) for A, with distribution defined by PrInvSelective. If this piece had been extracted from the Kurosawa/Ogata "proof" then the erroneous distribution of (h, e, f, s) would have been immediately clear.
One could try to rescue the Kurosawa/Ogata "theorem" by switching from the unstructured simulator to my principal simulator. But if r is principal then there is no reason to think that the equation r 2 = s 2 will lead to a factorization of pq! The "theorem" is actually an open question. (One can view this difficulty as an illustration of Coron's 2002 theorem.) My best result along these lines, as advertised in the introduction, is a tight security proof for fixed principal B = 1 Rabin/Williams signatures, with additional work described in subsequent sections of this paper.
Generic selective inversion using many signatures
Suppose we're given a public key pq, integers h 1 , h 2 , . . . , h Q , h ∈ 1, 2, . . . , 2 K , and a tweaked square root of each h i modulo pq. How quickly can we compute a tweaked square root of h modulo pq? One approach is to factor pq; are there better approaches?
More formally: Fix K and D. Fix Q ≥ 0. Fix α ∈ {unstructured, principal, |principal|}. For each algorithm A define PrInvSelective Q (A) as the chance that A (pq, h 1 , e 1 , f 1 , s 1 , . . . , h Q , e Q , f Q , s Q , h ) is some (e , f , s ) ∈ {−1, 1} × {1, 2} × {0, 1, . . . , pq − 1} satisfying e f (s ) 2 ≡ h (mod pq), when
• each h i is a uniform random element of 1, 2, . . . , 2 K , • (e i , f i , s i ) is a random tweaked square root of h i modulo pq with distribution α, • h is a uniform random element of 1, 2, . . . , 2 K , and all of these choices are independent. How large can PrInvSelective Q (A) be, as a function of the resources consumed by A?
The answer is that this problem is provably as difficult as factorization of public keys. The construction of SimSign Q is an easy generalization of last section's construction of SimSign 1 . For example, here is SimSign Q (A) for α = unstructured: 0. Input n and h . 1. For each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Q}: 2.
Generate a uniform random vector (e i , f i , s i ) in the usual range.
3.
Compute h i = e i f i s 2 i mod n.
4.
Go back to step 2 if h i / ∈ 1, 2, . . . , 2 K . 5. Print A(n, h 1 , e 1 , f 1 , s 1 , . . . , h Q , e Q , f Q , s Q , h ).
The remaining constructions work similarly. Proof. Exactly as in Section 4.
6 Generic existential inversion: the unstructured B = 0 case Suppose we're given a public key pq and integers h 1 , . . . , h Q+1 ∈ 1, 2, . . . , 2 K . We're allowed to adaptively select Q distinct i's and see tweaked square roots of the corresponding h i 's. Our goal is to compute a tweaked square root of the other h i . How quickly can we do this?
More formally: Fix K and D. Fix Q ≥ 0. Fix α ∈ {unstructured, principal, |principal|}. For each algorithm A define PrInvExistential Q (A) as follows. A is given a random secret key (p, q) from the distribution D, and uniform random elements h 1 , h 2 , . . . , h Q+1 of 1, 2, . . . , 2 K , all of these choices being independent. A makes Q distinct oracle queries i; in response to each i, A is given a random tweaked square root (e i , f i , s i ) of h i modulo pq with distribution α, again independently of other choices. Now PrInvExistential Q (A) is the probability that A outputs some (i, e , f , s ) ∈ {−1, 1} × {1, 2} × {0, 1, . . . , pq − 1} such that e f (s )
2 ≡ h i (mod pq) and such that i was not one of the oracle queries.
The big difference between this generic-existential-inversion problem and the generic-selectiveinversion problem in Section 5 is that we're now allowed to decide which of the h i 's will be easiest to attack. Does this make the problem easier? Perhaps we gain from the extra flexibility.
This section uses a new idea to show that there is no gain in the case of unstructured signatures. The reader might guess, after previous sections, that the proof constructs an algorithm for generic selective inversion or generic blind inversion; in fact, the proof jumps directly to the factorization problem. I don't know any way to get from a generic-existential-inversion algorithm to a genericblind-inversion algorithm, in the case B = 0, except via factorization.
The new idea. Let's review the standard proof that the gain is at most a factor Q + 1. Given a generic-existential-inversion algorithm A, build a generic-selective-inversion algorithm GuessSelection(A) that handles inputs (n, h 1 , e 1 , f 1 , s 1 , . . . , h Q , e Q , f Q , s Q , h ) as follows:
• Choose a uniform random integer π ∈ {1, . . . , Q + 1}.
• Insert h at position π in the list h 1 , . . . , h Q , and relabel the resulting list as h 1 , . . . , h Q+1 . Also relabel e i , f i , s i accordingly.
• Run A(n, h 1 , . . . , h Q+1 ), using e i , f i , s i to answer query i from A; abort if A selects i = π for a query rather than for output.
The choice of π is independent of the operation of A before an abort occurs, so GuessSelection(A) aborts with probability exactly Q/(Q + 1). If GuessSelection(A) does not abort then it runs A with the correct input distribution. This construction GuessSelection is the heart of the 1993 Bellare/Rogaway loose security proof. The random choice of π is a guess for the index i that A will use for its output. When a correct guess does occur, it makes the generic-existential-inversion problem equivalent to the genericselective-inversion problem, eliminating the extra flexibility of the generic-existential-inversion problem. Now let's review what Sections 3, 4, and 5 do with this algorithm GuessSelection(A). First GuessSelection(A) is converted into a generic-blind-forgery algorithm SimSign(GuessSelection(A)): each input h i is replaced by an output from the simulator. Then SimSign(GuessSelection(A)) is converted into a factorization algorithm RandSquare(SimSign(GuessSelection(A))): the input h is replaced by a random ef s 2 , so that a tweaked square root of h reveals a factorization of pq. Wait a minute! What's happening to h i is almost the same as what's happening to h . In fact, with the unstructured simulator, what's happening to h i is exactly the same as what's happening to h ! Why did we bother to distinguish h i from h in the first place? The new idea is to exploit unstructured signatures by treating all of the inputs h 1 , . . . , h Q+1 the same way, directly producing a factorization algorithm; there is no need to guess which one is h , and there is no need for a detour through GuessSelection(A).
Here is the new, direct, almost ludicrously simple construction of a factorization algorithm RandSquares(A) from a generic-existential-inversion algorithm A for α = unstructured: 0. Input n. 1. For each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Q + 1}: 2.
3.
4.
Go back to step 2 if h i / ∈ 1, 2, . . . , 2 K . 5. Compute (j, e , f , s ) = A(n, h 1 , . . . , h Q+1 ), using (e i , f i , s i ) to answer query i from A. There is no possibility of aborting here; we have an answer for every i! 6. If gcd{n, s − s j } / ∈ {1, n}, print it and stop. 7. If gcd{n, s } / ∈ {1, n}, print it and stop.
The time for RandSquares(A) is the time for A, on average the time for (Q + 1)n/2 K < 2(Q + 1) generations of h i , and the time for the final gcd computations.
Proof. Let (p, q) be a random secret key with distribution D. Inside (RandSquares(A))(pq), the quantities h 1 , . . . , h Q+1 are independent uniform random elements of 1, 2, . . . , 2 K . Thus the event e f (s ) 2 ≡ h j (mod pq) occurs with probability exactly PrInvExistential(A). Given this event, there is conditional probability at least 1/2 that one of s , s − s j has a nontrivial factor in common with pq, exactly as in Theorem 3.1.
Generic existential inversion: the B ≥ 1 case
Fix B ≥ 0. Suppose we're given a public key pq and random access to h 1 (0), . . . , h 1 (2
. We're allowed to adaptively select Q distinct i's; for each selected i we see a uniform random r i ∈ 0, 1, . . . , 2 B − 1 and a tweaked square root of h i (r i ). Our goal is to compute some r and some tweaked square root of h i (r) for the remaining i. How quickly can we do this?
As usual, the answer depends on α ∈ {unstructured, principal, |principal|}, the signature-choice parameter. Section 6 discussed the case α = unstructured, and gave a tight security proof for unstructured signatures for B = 0; this proof generalizes immediately to a tight security proof for unstructured signatures for all B. The initial computations of h i (r) might sound overly timeconsuming when B is large, because there are 2 B (Q + 1) pairs (i, r); but these computations can be deferred until they are actually needed.
What about α ∈ {principal, |principal|}? There is a tight security proof for all B ≥ 1, coming from a different way to build a factorization algorithm MixedSim(A) out of a generic-existentialinversion algorithm A. This algorithm MixedSim(A), given n,
• chooses a uniform random r i for each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Q + 1};
• uses the α simulator to build e i (r i ), f i (r i ), s i (r i ), h i (r i );
• uses the unstructured simulator to build e i (r), f i (r), s i (r), h i (r) for each r = r i ;
• runs A, answering query i with r i , e i (r i ), f i (r i ), s i (r i );
• aborts if the output j, r , e , f , s has r = r j ; and • tries gcd{s , n} and gcd{s − s j (r ), n} as factors of n.
This algorithm aborts with probability exactly 1/2 B : r j is independent of everything seen by A and therefore independent of r . If the algorithm does not abort then it has conditional probability at least 1/2 of factoring n, exactly as in Theorem 3.1.
Readers should recognize the central idea of this construction-choosing a random r i , building h i (r i ) according to the target simulator, and building h i (r) for r = r i to solve the underlying hard problem-as exactly the Katz/Wang idea used to prove [19, Section 4.1, Theorem 2]. Readers should also recognize, however, that [19, Section 4.1, Theorem 2] is stated at the level of generality of "claw-free permutation pairs" (following [18] and a suggestion of Dodis and Reyzin), which might sound quite general but are incapable of handling Rabin/Williams signatures. Several exponent-2 "claw-free permutation pairs" have been stated in the literature, but all of them have considerably slower signature verification than the Rabin/Williams system. One can easily recognize claws in the Rabin/Williams context, but they are claws between a 4-to-1 map and a 1-to-1 map, with two different algorithms for generating the inputs to the two maps.
For B = 0, the MixedSim construction accomplishes nothing. It never uses the unstructured simulator; it always aborts. The construction needs at least one bit of hash-input randomization to separate the target simulator from the unstructured simulator. Eliminating the abort does not produce a security proof: if s j was produced by (e.g.) the principal simulator then it is not a uniform random square root of its square and there is no reason to believe that s − s j (r ) will have a factor in common with n.
However, for α = unstructured, eliminating the abort does produce a security proof, and further eliminating the selection of r i produces exactly the new construction of Section 6. This is another way to see both the limitations and the power of the new idea in Section 6: the construction refuses to distinguish the α simulator from the unstructured simulator, and therefore requires α = unstructured, but the construction also skips the selection of r i , and therefore can handle B = 0.
Generic attacks
Let's review three typical examples of attacks on the Rabin/Williams system:
• NFS factorization: The attacker uses the number-field sieve to factor pq into (p, q). The attacker then chooses a message m , chooses a B-bit string r , computes h = H(r , m ) using an oracle for H, uses (p, q) to compute a tweaked square root (e , f , s ) of h , and forges the signature (e , f , r , s ) of m . This attack always succeeds, for all functions H. Fortunately, this attack is very slow when K is large.
• Signing leaks: The attacker chooses a message m and asks the signer for two signatures of m.
The signer responds with (e 1 , f 1 , r 1 , s 1 ) and (e 2 , f 2 , r 2 , s 2 ). The attacker computes gcd{s 2 , n} and gcd{s 1 − s 2 , n}, hoping to factor n and proceed as in the previous attack. In the case of variable unstructured B = 0 signatures, this attack succeeds with probability ≥ 1/2, for all functions H: notice that r 1 = r 2 since B = 0, and therefore that e 1 f 1 s The attacker asks the signer for a signature of m and then forges the same signature of m . This attack works if B = 0 and H is determined by MD5, a surprisingly common situation in practice. Fortunately, one can easily change H to stop the attack.
The first two attacks work for all functions H. The third does not. Let's ignore the third attack for the moment. Consider the class of "H-generic attacks" that work for all functions H-or that at least work for a large fraction of all functions H. How powerful are H-generic attacks against the Rabin/Williams system? Can they be better than factorization? Given an attack A that uses H as an oracle, define PrAttack(A) as the success probability of A against a D-distributed random public key n and a uniformly distributed random function H. Can PrAttack(A) be much larger than the other probabilities considered in this paper, as a function of the resources consumed by A?
Why fixed signatures are useful. The signing-leak example shows that these attacks can be quite successful: variable unstructured B = 0 signatures are broken by an extremely fast generic attack. But the picture is different for fixed signatures. For fixed signatures, generic attacks that see hash values of Q + 1 distinct messages are as difficult as Q-query generic existential inversion. Any generic-attack algorithm A is straightforwardly converted into a generic-existentialinversion algorithm FixSignatures(A) as follows: FixSignatures(A) runs A, keeps track of the distinct messages m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m Q+1 that are hashed, answers a hash query for (r, m i ) as h i (r), and answers a signature query for m i by feeding i to its tweaked-square-root oracle. The distribution of signatures in this algorithm is identical to the distribution of fixed signatures produced by a legitimate signer, so FixSignatures(A)'s chance of success is the same as A's chance of success against fixed signatures.
In particular, generic attacks on fixed signatures are as difficult as factorization whenever generic existential inversion is as difficult as factorization. The bottom line is that there cannot be any embarrassing generic attacks-attacks better than factorization-against fixed unstructured B ≥ 0 Rabin/Williams signatures, or against fixed principal B ≥ 1 Rabin/Williams signatures, or against fixed |principal| B ≥ 1 Rabin/Williams signatures.
Provable security: irrelevant for users, helpful for cryptanalysts. There are severe limits on the comfort that a user can draw from these tight security proofs. Maybe the attacker doesn't need anything better than factorization: perhaps an implementor chose K = 512; perhaps the attacker knows a fast factorization algorithm; perhaps the attacker owns a quantum computer. Even if pq really is difficult to factor, there is no guarantee of security against non-generic attacks.
Proofs of this type are nevertheless valuable time-savers for cryptographers. The proofs help focus cryptanalytic effort: cryptanalysts who aren't interested in factorization are guided by the knowledge that they'll have to come up with non-generic attacks. Furthermore, the literature is littered with examples of systems (usually without security proofs, but occasionally with nontight security proofs) subsequently broken by embarrassing generic attacks. Experience shows that proof construction and cryptanalysis are linked-a link I have tried to emphasize in my expository structure!-and that authors who attempt to build a proof for each system frequently end up discovering embarrassing attacks that would otherwise have been missed. Weeding out these bad systems saves far more time for the community than could possibly be saved by skipping security proofs.
I would not advocate a general rule of ignoring systems without tight security proofs. Sometimes insisting on tight security proofs is in conflict with choosing the most efficient system. In particular, Schnorr's short-signature system does not have a tight security proof but remains unbroken and is roughly twice as efficient as the closest competitors with tight security proofs-see, e.g., [19, Section 3] . On the other hand, the conflict for systems of RSA/Rabin type seems to have been mostly, if not entirely, eliminated by the proofs in this paper.
Exponent 2 does require some extra effort in security proofs, because a uniform distribution of s mod pq does not correspond to a uniform distribution of s 2 mod pq. The proof strategy here depends on whether signers choose uniform random square roots, or square roots distinguished by being squares, or square roots distinguished by being absolute values of squares.
History: Exponent 2 was introduced by Rabin in [31] . Most writers fail to give credit to Rabin for hashing and small exponents but do give credit to Rabin for exponent 2. I see no reason to use any other exponent; perhaps 2 will eventually become the most popular exponent, and, as a side effect, Rabin will receive more of the recognition that he deserves.
I posted the comment "The only Jacobi symbols used are b (p−1)/2 mod p, in situations where b (p+1)/4 mod p is going to be computed in any case" to sci.crypt in October 2000, in response to the comment "the Jacobi symbol is hard to grasp by the implementor." See [10] .
Message randomization: r. The Rabin/Williams system actually computes a square root of H(r, m), not a square root of H(m). Here r is a string selected randomly by the signer. The number of bits of r is a system parameter B. This randomization was introduced in [31] : Rabin suggested B = 60, with a random choice of r.
One can see, in the literature, five different strategies to choose the parameter B:
• Choose B = 0. This means that r is empty and that the H input is not actually randomized.
The main argument for this choice is that any larger B means extra effort to generate r, extra effort to include r in the H input, and extra effort to transmit r along with s.
• Choose B = 1. The main argument for this choice is that a nonzero B is required for the type of tight security proof introduced by Katz and Wang in [19] . The conventional wisdom is that B = 0 does not allow a tight security proof; see the "FDH" analyses in [8] and [14] . On the other hand, this paper challenges the conventional wisdom; this paper's new proof idea shows tight security for "fixed unstructured" signatures even in the case B = 0.
• Choose B = 8. As a historical matter, Rabin's system was able to produce signatures for only about 1/4 of all choices of r (since only a small fraction of all integers mod pq are squares), and Rabin suggested trying again if the first r failed; having 256 choices of r means that all choices will fail with probability about 2 −106 . However, the Rabin/Williams system eliminates these failures, as discussed below. The only remaining argument for B = 8 is that it marginally improves the tightness of the Katz/Wang approach.
• Choose B large enough to prevent the attacker from guessing r in advance; for example, B = 128. This choice allows a different type of tight security proof that is not considered in this paper and that seems to have been rendered obsolete by the idea of "fixed" signatures.
• Choose B large enough to prevent all collisions in r: for example, B = 256. This choice allows an older type of tight security proof that seems to have been obsolete for many years.
My impression is that, in practice, the choice B = 0 is by far the most popular choice, although I have not done an exhaustive study. One might wonder, from the above description, why large choices of B would attract any interest, and in particular why Rabin chose B = 60 rather than B = 8. The answer is that large choices of B are often conjectured to make non-generic attacks, attacks that pay attention to the hash function H, more difficult. For example, MD5-based signatures have been broken for B = 0 but not for B = 128. Does a larger B allow us to choose a smaller, faster hash function H? Could this compensate for the direct costs of a longer r? Resolving these questions means understanding the cost-security tradeoff for hash functions, obviously not an easy task. For the moment I recommend that theoreticians remain agnostic and continue to investigate all possible B's. required by r was the only disadvantage of a large B. Maybe a large B stops attacks." There are several problems with this argument. First, bandwidth is only part of the picture: for example, a larger B means a larger cost to generate r. Second, signed messages are usually uncompressed; one important reason is that uncompressed signatures (and expanded signatures, as discussed below) allow faster verification. Third, except when (r, m) is extremely short, the alleged savings is a myth. Adding 128 bits to r means pushing 128 bits of m out of the compressed prefix of (r, m), and therefore adding 128 bits to the length of the signed message.
